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Abstract—The IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks (RPL) was recently introduced as the new
routing standard for the Internet of Things. Although RPL
defines basic security modes, it remains vulnerable to topological
attacks which facilitate blackholing, interception, and resource
exhaustion. We are concerned with analyzing the corresponding
threats and protecting future RPL deployments from such
attacks.
Our contributions are twofold. First, we analyze the state of
the art, in particular the protective scheme VeRA and present
two new rank order attacks as well as extensions to mitigate
them. Second, we derive and evaluate TRAIL, a generic scheme
for topology authentication in RPL. TRAIL solely relies on the
basic assumptions of RPL that (1) the root node serves as a
trust anchor and (2) each node interconnects to the root as part
of a hierarchy. Using proper reachability tests, TRAIL scalably
and reliably identifies any topological attacker without strong
cryptographic efforts.
Index Terms—IoT, routing security, mobile security, perfor-
mance
I. INTRODUCTION
RPL [1] has been designed as an efficient and scalable
routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (LLN).
It promises to reduce the overall power consumption by
minimizing the control traffic, which is a major requirement
for the energy constrained devices envisioned in the future In-
ternet of Things (IoT). Such tiny intercommunicating devices
like sensor nodes used in (home) automation, smart grids or
surveillance systems are expected to massively populate our
environment soon.
RPL constructs one or several tree topologies oriented
towards a single root node. Each node in the RPL routing
graph has a rank derived from its parent relationship that
describes the topological distance to the root. Every node
joining the topology calculates a higher rank than its parent,
lower ranks are used for default upstream. This proactive
organization leads to a Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic
Graph (DODAG) topology, from which RPL is able to detect
and remove inconsistencies reactively.
Control traffic in this topology consists of DODAG In-
formation Objects (DIOs). A DIO advertises parameters and
constraints for a specific DODAG that is uniquely identified by
a version number. A node uses the information obtained from
a DIO to select a parent node, compute its rank and join the
DODAG, from which it inherits an upward route towards the
root node. An optional upwards advertisement of Destination
Advertisement Objects (DAO) generates downward-oriented
routes to children of a subtree. Depending on the mode of
operation, these routes are either maintained and stored at
each node (storing mode), or forwarded to the root node and
collected there (non-storing mode). The integrity of distribu-
tion trees is essential for RPL, as an inconsistent hierarchy
will lead to traffic redirections and a loss of routes to the
root. In addition, RPL will attempt to cure tree deficiencies
by reorganization, and a node that will hold up failures of the
routing hierarchy may trigger repeated reconfigurations that
drain resources of the network.
RPL offers basic protection against external attackers break-
ing into the topology [1]. However, as nodes may be captured
and security keys can be extracted from them, the RPL
topology is threatened by various attacks from inside the
network [2]. The rank of a node and the DODAG version
number are focal attributes in the topology. Known attacks
are foremost based on them. A false rank of a node forges the
relative topological distance to the root and thus disarranges
the hierarchy. An inconsistent version breaks the reference to
the topological graph and causes the network to rebuild its
routing graph. Corresponding protections are not part of the
current RPL specifications.
As major countermeasure, VeRA [3] has been proposed
to fix these two classes of vulnerabilities by adding reverse
hash chaining to DIO messages. Receivers shall be enabled to
verify the advertised hierarchy. However, in the following we
can show that VeRA remains vulnerable to rank attacks by
forgery and replay. Furthermore, we present a more generic
approach to solve the problem of topology authentication in
RPL. Leaving aside the complexity of VeRA, our remaining
work concentrates on a generic scheme for verifying RPL
topologies. In detail, our contributions are the following:
1) We analyze the incompleteness of message-rank-
authentication in VeRA.
2) We present enhancements to VeRA for repair.
3) We introduce TRAIL (Trust Anchor Interconnection
Loop), which can discover and isolate bogus nodes while
these nodes attack the RPL routing hierarchy. TRAIL is
derived of first hand principles and resolves the issues
of topological infringements.
4) We implement TRAIL on the RIOT platform [4] and
evaluate it in a large-scale testbed.
5) We will make our implementation openly available.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. Section
II discusses the problem of securing RPL, common attacks
and related work. The incompleteness of VeRA is examined
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Fig. 1. REGULAR RPL ROUTING HIERARCHY
in Section III. Countermeasures for fixing VeRA are presented
in Section IV. Section V introduces and thoroughly evaluates
TRAIL, our generic solution for topology authentication. Fi-
nally, we conclude in Section VII and look out on future work.
II. RPL SECURITY CHALLENGES & RELATED WORK
RPL constructs a reverse path forwarding hierarchy by
announcing tree parameters in the downward direction, starting
from the root node. A node that successfully joined the tree
advertises its rank towards its potential children in so called
DIO messages, while unconnected nodes select as parent the
neighbor of lowest rank, i.e., in closest position to the root.
Following this algorithm, a fully connected acyclic, hierarchi-
cal graph is created in compliance to wireless reachability.
Each of such DODAGs is associated with a unique version
number to survey consistency. A regular RPL routing topology
is displayed in Fig. 1.
RPL specifies secured control plane messages for authen-
ticity, integrity, and optional confidentiality [1]. Even though
these basic security features defend against external attackers
[5], RPL remains unprotected against adversaries from inside
the network [3], [6]. Capturing a node and extracting security
credentials enables an attacker to gain access to the control
plane and to modify the routing topology. The rank and the
version number are the key information for defining the struc-
ture of the routing system. The essential challenge for securing
the routing topology thus is to protect rank and version number
from any unwanted modification. Strong identity-based end-
to-end authentification as introduced in [7] could defend a
RPL routing system against internal modifications. However,
its inherent complexity prevent this from being a standard
(a) Topology after a rank spoofing (b) Topology after a replay attack
Fig. 2. RPL topology (a) with rank spoofing. The attacker M propagates a
rank jM falsely decreased by ∆, and thereby incorrectly attracts nodes 1, 2,
4, and the parent node H , which creates a sinkhole. (b) visualizes a replay
of the parent rank, only attracting nodes 1, 2, and 4 with intact upstream to
H .
solution. Next, we introduce the core attacks against the RPL
topology and the assumptions made on the attacker.
A. Attacker Model
We assume the presence of one or multiple attackers that
physically captured and compromised multiple, arbitrary nodes
on the network. The attacker has access to all available keys on
the captured nodes, which include all information for joining
and participating in the DODAG without restrictions. The
compromised nodes are successfully integrated in the network
and are thus authorized to transmit authenticated messages.
Furthermore, the attacker is limited by the resources and
constraints of the captured nodes. Hence, we assume that the
attacker cannot install directed antennas or create multiple
identities [8] to seemingly use several malicious nodes with
one physical interface or to establish out-of-band channels.
The attacker aims at maximizing his impact on the network,
for example by attracting as much traffic as possible for
eavesdropping or sink-holing, or by affecting the operational
conditions of as many nodes as possible.
B. Topology Attacks
1) Version Number Attacks: The version number of the
DODAG is increased by the root node, whenever a global
repair is needed. This occurs, if inconsistencies cannot be
repaired locally. In a version number attack [3], an attacker
illegally increases the version number of the DODAG. Pub-
lishing a higher version number will lead to a reconstruction
of the RPL topology. This either serves as a preparation for
a following attack such as on the rank, or can be repeatedly
executed to disturb the network and drain the resources of
nodes.
2) Rank Spoofing Attack: In a rank spoofing attack [3],
a malicious node propagates an incorrect rank to change its
position in the routing tree. Commonly, an attacker will choose
a lower rank to improve its position in the hierarchy and
achieve larger impact on the network. In response to forged
rank advertisements, neighboring nodes select the attacker as
parent and forward traffic towards it. Fig. 2(a) visualises the
topological manipulations caused by a strict rank decrease.
The attacker M propagates the lowest rank of the vicinity
and attracts all its neighbors. In this example, the parent
node H is also attracted by the malicious node M , which
creates a sinkhole. Node 3 correctly selects M as parent, but
unknowingly propagates the illegal rank downtree. Thus, 3 and
its parents potentially attract even more children and increase
the number of nodes that forward traffic towards the attacker
M .
3) Rank Replay Attack: An attacker who learned a valid
rank from a (potential) parent may replay this value in its
own advertisements and pretend to run at one hierarchy level
above the proper value. This special case of a rank spoofing
will not disconnect the attacker from the root as visualised
in Fig. 2(b). In contrast to arbitrary rank forgery, the replay
allows a malicious node to re-use a proper rank, even if rank
verification schemes apply. We will show in the following
section that present protection schemes are vulnerable to rank
replay attack.
C. Related Work
Recent work has classified the different attacks on RPL [9],
but only limited work has addressed the security of the RPL
routing system. A security threat analysis for LLNs by the
IETF [5] focuses on potential threats and attacks. However,
the analysis solely proposes generic countermeasures to the
described attacks. Some attempts have been made to deal
with topology attacks [10], [3], [11], [12], [13]. The authors
in [10] propose an Intrusion Detection System to mitigate
the rank attack and a local repair mechanism by installing
additional monitoring nodes. The authors of [13] present a
mitigation strategy that allows nodes to dynamically adapt
against a topological inconsistency attack based on the current
network conditions. VeRA addresses the rank and version
number attacks by adding a rank and version control obtained
from hash chaining [3], [14]. While successfully mitigating
a version number attack, the VeRA approach is still subject
to two topology attacks [15]. As we will work out in the
following section, the first attack is a general rank spoofing,
which allows an attacker to pretend any rank and therefore
any position in the DODAG. The second attack is a rank reply
attack, which allows an attacker to claim one level closer to
the root by replaying its parent’s rank. Weekly and Pister [11]
concentrate on the evaluation of sinkhole attacks and their
impact on the data throughput in RPL. They utilize a rank
authentication based on VeRA and introduce a parent fail-
over technique to blacklist sinkhole nodes. The root maintains
a list of nodes that go below a threshold, which defines the
minimum expected data receptions for each node. A node that
TABLE I
GLOSSARY OF NOTATIONS
Symbol Definition
i Index for Version Hash Chain (0, . . . , n)
j Index for Rank Hash Chain (0, . . . , l)
l Last Index of Rank Hash Element (= 216 − 1)
n Last Index of Version Hash Element
Vi i-th Element of Version Hash Chain
Ri,j j-th Element of Rank Hash Chain for i-th Version
r Random Seed for Version Hash Chain
xi Random Seed for Rank Hash Chain at Version i
VNi Numeric Version Number at Version i
ci i-th Element of Encryption Chain
finds itself on the list, blacklists its default next-hop towards
the root, since some node on the path seems to not forward
traffic. The authors observe that an adversary can attack VeRA
by replaying the rank of his parent. Similarly, Wallgren et al.
[12] propose to maintain a whitelist in combination with a
heartbeat protocol in which the root periodically sends echo
requests to each node to check the connectivity. A node that
does not respond is considered malicious and is thus removed
from the whitelist.
Our work goes beyond mitigating sinkhole attacks. By per-
forming generic topological tests, we inquire on the integrity of
the routing hierarchy, identify and isolate individual attackers.
The rank protection approaches discussed above rely on the
authentication of digital signatures. Authentication in RPL
is implemented either by an asymmetric signature scheme
like RSA [16], or a symmetric message authentication code
like CBC-MAC [17] with a pre-shared key. Even though the
complex use of asymmetric cryptography in wireless LLNs
remains a challenge for class 1 devices [18], [19], [20], it adds
the advantage to unambiguously authenticate the sender of a
message [7]. Conversely, when a MAC is created from a group
key, it suffers the disadvantage of authenticating any sender
from that group. Recent work on pre-computation techniques
[21] strengthened the case for standard signature deployment
on sensor nodes. In this work, we rely on the RPL root node
as a trust anchor, since it is commonly deployed as a more
powerful gateway node. Signature creation remains bound to
this RPL root.
III. ATTACKING VERA
A. VeRA in a Nutshell
VeRA is performed in two steps: initialization and version
number update. The scheme assumes that the nodes are given
a public key pk for a public key signature scheme like RSA,
and the corresponding secret key sk is known only to the
DODAG root.
1) Initialization: The DODAG root generates the hash
chains to be used for securing version number and rank
updates. For n version updates, the root picks a random
number r, a secure hash function h, and computes a hash
chain, {r, Vi}i=0,···,n, with Vi = hn+1−i(r). Additionally, the
root generates a rank hash chain of size l+ 1 for each version
Vi. Let Ri,0, · · · , Ri,l denote the rank hash chain for Vi.
Then, its elements are computed as {Ri,j = hj+1(xi)}j=0,···,l,
where xi is a random number. Subsequently, for bootstrap-
ping the security, the root broadcast an initialization message
{V0, V N0,MACV1(R1,l), σ} to all nodes in a DIO message.
Thereby, V N0 denotes an initial version number chosen by the
root and σ = Sigsk(V0, V N0,MACV1(R1,l)) the signature.
Each node stores this message after verifying the signature
using the public key pk.
2) Version number update: To update the version of a
DODAG from V N i−1 to V N i, the root sends a DIO
message {V N i, Vi,MACVi+1(Ri+1,l), Ri,Ranksender}, where
Ranksender is its new rank1. Each intermediate node receiving
this message checks first whether the new version number
is higher than the current one, i.e., if V N i > VN i−1.
If this is the case, it continues to verify that the version
update was indeed initialized by the root by checking if
V0 = h
(V Ni−V N0)(Vi) = hi(Vi) holds. If any of these
verifications fails, the node terminates the version update
operation. Otherwise, it proceeds with verifying the rank
of its parent by checking the hash chain consistency, i.e.,
MACVi(h
l−Rankparent(Ri,Rankparent)) = MACVi(Ri,l).
Note that MACVi(Ri,l) was received in the previous update,
while Vi is received in the current update. Finally, the child
node calculates its own rank τ using the objective function
and forwards the received DIO message to nodes lower
in the topology with the corresponding rank chain element
Ri,Ranksender = h
(τ−Rankparent)(Ri,Rankparent).
B. (In)Security of VeRA
The security of VeRA relies on the assumption that increas-
ing the version number or decreasing the rank value requires
an attacker to compute the pre-image of a hash chain element.
However, due to the stateful nature of the VeRA protocol, the
pre-image resistance of the hash chains alone are not sufficient
for security. VeRA is a stateful protocol, since the security
of each version update relies on the parameters revealed in
a previous update. Although, the initialization message is
signed, as shown in Section III-B1, it is not sufficient to
mitigate rank chain forgery performed by malicious insiders
or when jamming attacks are considered. Hence, additional
methods preserving backward secrecy of the rank hash chains
are needed to mitigate VeRA against such attacks2. Within the
scope of the VeRA protocol, we give the following definitions:
Definition 1 (Perfect-backward-secure version update pro-
tocol): A version update protocol is perfect-backward-secure
if an adversary cannot efficiently calculate a valid rank hash
chain {x′i, R′i,l}i∈{n,···,1} with xi 6= x′i even if it is given all
elements of the version hash chain, i.e., Vn3, the corresponding
rank hash chains {xi, Ri,l}i=n,···,1, and the signature σ. A hash
chain {x′i, R′i,l} is valid, if its verification in the ith version
1For the root, Ri,Ranksender = h
Rankroot (xi).
2Solutions based on time synchronization are not considered in this work.
3All other elements Vn−1, · · · , V0, can be calculated from Vn
update, i.e., {V N i}i∈{n,···,1}, at any receiving node returns a
success.
Definition 2 (λ-backward-secure version update protocol):
A version update protocol is λ-backward-secure if an ad-
versary cannot efficiently calculate a valid rank hash chain
{x′i, R′i,l}i∈{n,···,1} with xi 6= x′i even if it is given up to λ < n
elements of the version hash chain, i.e., Vλ, the corresponding
rank hash chains {xi, Ri,l}i=λ,···,1, and the signature σ. A hash
chain {x′i, R′i,l} is valid, if its verification in the ith version
update, i.e., {V N i}i∈{n,···,1}, at any receiving node returns a
success.
Lemma. The VeRA protocol is a λ-backward-secure version
update protocol.
Proof (Sketch): Consider a VeRA setting for n = 3. Fur-
thermore, consider the version hash chain {r, V3, V2, V1, V0},
and the rank hash chains {{x3, R3,l}, {x2, R2,l}, {x1, R1,l}}.
Given the version hash chain element V2, the adversary can
calculate a valid hash chain {x′2, R′2,l} by simply picking a
random number x′2 6= x2 and subsequently authenticating R′2,l
with the MAC using V2 as the key. This rank hash chain would
be verified as valid in a version update V2. Hence, the VeRA
protocol is 2-backward-secure version update protocol. That
is, it remains secure against rank hash chain forgery as long
as no version hash chain element Vλ≥2 is compromised.
Remark Praxis relevance of backward-secrecy. RPL is a
routing protocol for LLNs. A typical characteristic of such
networks, such as WSNs, is that they are often deployed
in public and even in hostile environments. Hence, they are
typically easy to access by attackers. Wireless communication
used in such networks allows an attacker to disrupt and even
entirely block the communication between nodes. For instance,
(selective) jamming attacks [22] allow to partition a network.
Similarly, selective-forwarding attacks [23] allow the attacker
to drop selected packets during routing. Such attacks allow the
adversary for decreasing its own rank and, hence, the rank of
those nodes located in its sub-DODAG if the version update
protocol used is only λ-backward-secure like VeRA. In the
following, we describe a practical rank chain forgery attack in
existence of e.g., selective-forwarding or jamming attacks.
1) Rank hash chain forgery attack: VeRA is only 2-
backward-secure. Hence, it is vulnerable to rank chain forgery.
Such an attack might be performed as follows. The DIO mes-
sages for two subsequent version updates V N i and V N i+1
are prevented from being received by all or some of the
nodes within the network. This can be achieved e.g., through
a selective-forwarding or (selective-)jamming attack on the
DIO messages of the version updates. After receiving the hash
chain element Vi+1 in the version update V N i+1, the attacker
calculates a bogus hash chain {x′i+1, R′i+1,l} by simply pick-
ing a random number x′i+1 and subsequently authenticating
it with the MAC using Vi+1 as the key. Subsequently, the
blocked version update V N i is resumed by forwarding the
DIO message containing the MAC of the forged rank hash
chain MACVi+1(R
′
i+1,l). Finally, once the version update
V N i is completed, the version update V N i+1 is initiated, in
which the attacker can claim an arbitrary rank value.
2) Rank replay attack: In each rank update, VeRA discloses
the cryptographic credentials needed for verifying the adver-
tisements from parents to each node. These credentials are
not bound to any sender-specific attributes. Hence, a malicious
node can transparently forward them down the tree to decrease
its rank. As visualized in Fig. 2(b), a malicious node M
receives valid rank announcements from the honest node H .
This includes the version hash Vi, its rank j, and the associated
hash element Ri,j . It can simply re-use them in its own rank
advertisements to nodes 1 . . . 4 for gaining one hierarchy level.
In consequence, the honest nodes 1, 2, and 4 can verify the
bogus rank announcements and prefer M over H due to
better connectivity. Node 3 correctly selects M as parent,
but calculates a falsely improved rank. All children of M
propagate maliciously lowered ranks down the sub-DODAG.
IV. FIXING VERA
We introduce two countermeasures to fix VeRA against the
described attacks. Our first countermeasure makes the VeRA
approach perfect-backward-secure and, hence, it mitigates the
rank hash chain forgery attacks. Our second countermeasure is
a simple challenge-response procedure proposed for mitigating
the rank replay attacks.
A. VeRA++: Perfect-backward-secure VeRA
VeRA authenticates a rank hash chain for a version Vi using
a MAC keyed with Vi. In each version number update a MAC
key is revealed. Hence, VeRA provides only the λ-backward-
secrecy. To achieve the perfect-backward-secrecy, we propose
to authenticate the rank hash chains using an encryption chain
instead of MACs. In the following, we first describe the
construction of the proposed encryption chain. Subsequently,
we describe the VeRA++ approach, i.e. an extension of VeRA
with the proposed encryption chain. Finally, we show that
VeRA++ provides the perfect-backward-secrecy.
1) Construction of the encryption chain: After generating
the version number hash chain and the rank hash chains
{xi, Ri,l}i=n,...,1 as described in Section III-A, the root node
computes the (rank) encryption chain {ci}i=n,...,1 as follows:
cn is set to the last element of the rank hash chain for Vn, i.e.,
cn = Rn,l. Subsequent elements of the encryption chain ci are
calculated by encrypting the last element of the corresponding
rank hash chain Ri,l using ci+1 as the encryption key. That
is, {ci = encci+1(Ri,l)}i=n−1,...,1, where enc is a symmetric
key encryption scheme such as AES.
2) Extension of VeRA with the encryption chain: In
VeRA++, the initialization and version number update steps
are performed slightly different than in VeRA. In the ini-
tialization step, the root broadcast the initialization message
{V0, V N0, c1, cn, σ} to all nodes in a DIO message. Thereby,
σ = Sigsk(V0, V N0, c1, cn). As in the VeRA, each node
stores this message after verifying the signature with pk.
In the version number update step, to update the version of
DODAG from V N i−1 to V N i, the root sends a DIO mes-
sage {V N i, Vi, ci, Ri,Ranksender}. Similar to the VeRA, each
intermediate node receiving first checks if the new version
number is higher than the current one, i.e., if V N i > VN i−1.
If this is the case, it continues to verify that the version
update was indeed initialized by the root by checking if
V0 = h
(V Ni−V N0)(Vi) = hi(Vi) holds. If one of these verifi-
cations fail, the node terminates the version update operation.
Otherwise, it proceeds with verifying the rank of its parent.
Assume that the parent node claims to have the rank value
Rankparent. The child node verifies its validity by checking if
hl−Rankparent = decci(ci−1). Note that ci−1 was received in
the previous update. A successful verification implies that the
rank of its parent is increasing monotonically4. Subsequently,
the child node calculates its own rank τ using the objective
function and forwards the received DIO message to the nodes
lower in the topology as in VeRA.
3) Security of VeRA++: We show that the VeRA++ ap-
proach is a perfect-backward-secure version update protocol.
Proposition. The VeRA++ approach described above is a
perfect-backward-secure version update protocol if the under-
lying encryption function enc, the signature scheme Sig, and
the hash function h are cryptographically secure.
Proof (Sketch): Assume that the VeRA++ approach a
λ-backward-secure version update protocol. Then, according
to our definition, given a hash chain element Vλ with λ <
n and the encryption chain {ci}i=λ,···,1 and the rank hash
chains {xi, Ri,l}i=λ,···,1 and the signature σ, there exist an
efficient algorithm that calculates a forged rank hash chain
{x′i, R′i,l} with xi 6= x′i which is valid for a version update
{V N i}i∈{n,···,1}.
• i = 1: c1 is signed. Thus, there is only one possibility
for calculating a forged rank hash chain {x′1, R′1,l} with
x′1 6= x1. The adversary needs to find a c′2 such that
R′1,l = decc′2(c1) for an arbitrarily chosen x
′
1. The prob-
ability of finding such inputs (c′2, c1, x
′
1) is negligible if
the underlying encryption function enc is secure and the
hash function h is pre-image resistant and the signature
scheme is secure.
• i = λ: For calculating a forged rank hash chain
{x′λ, R′λ,l} with x′λ 6= xλ, the adversary needs to find
a c′λ+1 such that R
′
λ,l = decc′λ+1(cλ) for an arbitrar-
ily chosen x′λ. However, the probability of such inputs
(c′λ+1, cλ, x
′
λ) is negligible if the underlying encryption
function enc is secure and the hash function h is pre-
image resistant and the signature scheme is secure5.
• i = n: cn = Rn,l is signed. Thus, there is only one possi-
bility for calculating a forged rank hash chain{x′n, R′n,l}
with xn 6= x′n. The adversary needs to forge the signa-
ture message σ. However, the probability of a signature
forgery is negligible if the underlying signature scheme
is secure.
4In the last version update, no decryption is required since cn = Rn,l.
5If the adversary would be allowed to choose both c′λ+1 and c
′
λ, it could
easily calculate R′λ,l. However, choosing c
′
λ is not allowed: each node accepts
the cλ+1 only if deccλ+1 (cλ) yields a valid rank hash chain Rλ,l, where
c1, i.e., R1,l is signed. Thus, for choosing a new c′λ 6= cλ, the adversary
needs to forge the signature σ.
This shows that a rank hash chain forgery for λ ≤ n requires
to break the security of either h or enc or Sig. Hence, given
the secure instances of algorithms h, enc, and Sig, according
to our definition, the VeRA++ protocol is a perfect-backward-
secure version update protocol.
B. Countermeasure against Rank Replay Attacks
To mitigate rank replay attacks, we introduce a challenge-
response scheme bASED on the rank hierarchy implemented
by RPL. A malicious node, claiming a lower rank value than
its actual value, is challanged to prove that it has a parent node
of lower rank than the claimed.
1) General Idea: Each RPL node receives the rank hash
chain element of its parent to verify the parent’s rank as well as
to calculate its own rank. A parent node, claiming to have the
rank j−1 in a version update i, sends the hash chain element
Ri,j−1 to its children. Each child receiving this message
verifies it by checking if Ri,l = hl−(j−1)(Ri,j−1) holds.
However, due to pre-image resistance of the hash function
h, they cannot calculate Ri,j−2, i.e., the hash chain element
valid for their grandparent nodes. Our scheme relies on this
one-way property of the rank hash chains. That is, any node
claiming to have a rank j knows (or can calculate) the hash
chain element of their parents, their own, and their children
only, i.e. {Ri,k}k=j−1,...,l. The hash chain elements for lower
ranks (e.g.., for their grandparents) {Ri,k′}k′=1,...,j−2 remain
unknown to them (or cannot be calculated by them). Hence,
any node claiming to have a rank j must be able to encrypt
a challenge message using Ri,j−1 as the key, correctly. An
attacker that incorrectly replays the rank hash element of its
own parent cannot encrypt such a challenge, since it needs to
know the key Ri,j−2 in such a case.
2) Challenge-Response Scheme: Assume that the node M
depicted in Fig. 3 is suspicious of replaying the rank j of
its parent H to obtain an improved position in the DODAG
topology. To verify the rank of M , the parent node H
constructs a challenge message 〈IDM , r〉, which includes the
host ID of M IDM and a random number r. This message
is to be encrypted by M with Ri,j−1. M shall reply with
encRi,j−1(〈IDM , r〉) to H . H can then check whether M holds
the correct rank. If M cannot solve the challenge, it has no
valid parent of the claimed rank and incorrectly announced j.
3) Applying the Challenge-Response Scheme: The
challenge-response scheme is initiated by a RPL node
that complies with two requirements: (a) it is at the same
rank level as claimed by the attacker, (b) it is within the
transmission range of the attacker. The first requirement
allows for self-organization among RPL nodes according to
correct and incorrect ranks (i.e., who initiates the challenge).
The second requirement is necessary to react on suspicious
rank announcements (i.e., observing rank upgrade). It is
noteworthy that these requirements fully comply to the RPL
protocol message design.
Our approach detects the potential attack by requiring each
node to multicast its rank to all neighbors. If a parent H detects
an inconsistent routing state, which is not removed by a local
H
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Fig. 3. (a) The attacker M replays the rank announcement via multicast and
creates a malformed local topology. (b) Its parent HP is in transmission range
and receives the replay, as well. The honest node challenges the attacker by
sending a random number r. The challenge can only be solved if M has a
relation with the grandparent node HGP , i.e., knows Ri,j−1.
repair, the suspicious node is challenged to proof its rank. If
the node does not pass the challenge, either the sub-DODAG
can simply be excluded from upward routing, or the root node
can be included in the validation process. The root creates a
validation packet for the children of the malicious node M .
Finally, as many surrounding nodes as possible are informed
about the rank state of node M . This gives each node the
ability to independently react and for example discard M as
a routing node. Note that the root node can trust H after the
update is delivered successfully and the replay detection is
applied recursively from H to the root.
Remark. Our challenge-response scheme is not secure in
existence of out-of-band channels or k directly connected
attackers. An attacker, who can obtain the rank hash chain
element for a rank j−∆ through such a tunnel, can correctly
respond any challenge issued for verifying the ranks ≤ j−∆.
Another limitation of this approach is that the children of a
malicious cannot be reliably notified about an attack. Introduc-
ing a white- or blacklist containing benign or malicious nodes
respectively, as proposed in [12] and [11], holds the drawback
of straining the entire network with local information. Hence,
in the next section we propose TRAIL which inverses the
direction of rank validations.
V. TRAIL – TRUST ANCHOR INTERCONNECTION LOOP
We introduce TRAIL, our generic approach to detect and
prevent topological inconsistencies. In contrast to the previous
approaches, each node is enabled to validate its upward path
to the root and to detect rank spoofing on it. Our test further-
more identifies the largest sub-DODAG(s) affected by non-
monotonous rank order. Having learned such inconsistency,
the root of that sub-DODAG may either trigger a local repair,
or disconnect its malicious sub-tree and rely on alternate paths.
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Fig. 4. TRAIL SINGLE RANK VALIDATION: Node 3 initiates the rank
validation by sending a nonce, η, to parent M . In (a) M announces its true
rank. The message arrives at the root and is singed. In (b) M uses a forged
rank, hence the message is dropped.
In the following, we treat ranks as monotonously increasing
integers. It is noteworthy that any RPL rank function is
monotonous and can be reverted to an integer chain.
A. TRAIL Idea: Path Validation
The key idea of TRAIL is to validate upward paths to the
root using a round trip message. Without relying on encryption
chains as in VeRA(++), a node can conclude rank integrity
from a recursively intact upward path.
A child node that received a rank advertisement from its
parent initiates a positive attestation of the rank as follows.
It sends a test message with a random nonce η upwards to
its parent. The parent adds its rank j and forwards the test
message 〈j, η〉 upstream towards the root. At each intermediate
hop, the receiving upper node verifies that (a) the rank in the
test message is higher than its own, and (b) the rank of the
sending node lies in between the rank of the test message and
its own. If a rank violation is observed, the test message is
discarded and the sub-DODAG gets either disconnected or a
local repair is started (see Fig. 4). The test message eventually
arrives at the root, which adds the current version number to
the test message and signs for its way back to the initiating
client. Before forwarding, every node verifies whether the
signed message contains the scribed rank j that is larger than
its own rank. A violation stops the propagation of the message.
On reception, the client verifies the signature, matches its
nonce, and obtains evidence of the current version number and
the rank advertised by its parent. As the rank announcement
had consistently travelled to the root, no honest node on the
path had observed a rank violation and the upstream is valid.
A child not receiving the reply, continues without positive
attestation of its parent. It may choose another upstream, if
available, or apply additional measures for transport security.
After all nodes have applied this test recursively down the
hierarchy with success, it is assured that none of the nodes
has a parent that illegally lowered its rank. The highest ranked
node that unsuccessfully performs the test identifies the root of
the largest sub-DODAG affected by rank spoofing. It should be
noted, though, that a directly connected chain of k malicious
nodes can secretly replay rank values k − 1 times so that
they are counted in the test as one node. However, this costly
attack does not decrease rank values of the attackers, but solely
extends the wireless reach of the malicious group and cannot
be observed without surveillance of the wireless geometry.
As every node in the network needs to inquire with the
root individually, the overhead in messages and signature
processing grows linearly with the network size. Hence, this
simple scheme of path validation suffers the obvious drawback
of scalability. In the following, we will present an aggregated
scheme that keeps messages per node and signature computa-
tion constant.
B. Scalable Path Validation
1) Rank Attestation Scheme: The path validation can be
turned into a scalable procedure by aggregating all client-
specific inquiries into a single message exchange. Starting
from the leaf nodes of a DODAG, we design a convergecast
that reaches up to the root. The root node receives and signs
a single, converged request that serves as a universal path
attestation message when distributed downtree via multicast.
After a leaf node Nl,k of the DODAG has received the
rank advertisement of its parent (and discovered that it has
no further children), it issues a nonce ηl,k to its parent. The
parent node collects the nonces {ηl,k}k of all children and
writes them into a single array element. For space efficiency,
the parent combines the nonces in a Bloom filter [24]. Note
that this Bloom filter can be very short, as the number of
entries is limited by the number of children per node. This
array element containing a single Bloom filter is sent upstream
to the grandparent and saved by the node.
From each of its children, the grandparent receives such
an array of Bloom filters together with an individual nonce. It
should be noted that these arrays need not be of equal lengths,
as the tree may be unbalanced. The grandparent aligns every
array on the position below the child node rank and merges the
entries of equal index using the scalable Bloom filter technique
of Almeida et al. [25]. In detail, the grandparent node extracts
all first index elements Ai(1), merges them and writes the
result to a new output array B at the index 2 (incremented
by one). In general, {Ai(k)}i are merged into B(k + 1), if
existent. Finally, the node adds the Bloom filter that aggregates
all nonces of its immediate children to the array element B(1)
forwards the array B upwards together with its own nonce and
saves both B and its nonce.
As depicted in Fig. 5, in proceeding this way stepwise
towards the root, an array is created whose index represents
the rank and whose values are merged Bloom filters of all
nonces issued at a specific rank. Thereby array elements
are of variable length, each accommodating the concatenated
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Bloom filters as generated according to the shape of the tree.
Additionally every node on the path saves the array and nonce
they forward for latter validation. The root node adds the
current version number and signs the data structure consisting
of the Bloom filter array and the version number. Thereafter,
the signed data is distributed via multicast down the tree.
On the reception, each node can verify the version, and
the rank of its parent. It accesses the corresponding array
element to match its nonce in the Bloom filter and verifies that
no further array element contains the same nonce. Finally, it
verifies that the signed Bloom filter array does not contain
less nonces than the previously saved array. Note that the
probability of a false positive hit can be chosen sufficiently
low when configuring the Bloom filter. A successful match
testate that ranks have increased monotonically from the root
downwards and that the array and contained nonces have not
been manipulated or reordered. Whenever the matching fails
(see Fig. 6), monotonic rank order has been violated on the
upward path from the current node to the root. The highest
ranked node detecting such violation forms the root of an
inconsistently connected sub-DODAG. Any node experiencing
such inconsistency may choose another upstream, if available,
or apply additional measures for transport security.
2) Security Proof: We show that a malicious node cannot
improve its rank by modifying the data structure, and that
improper modifications are detected in the verification phase.
Assumptions. We rely on the attacker model specified in
Section II-A. In particular, we refer to an attacker that has
no means to establish an out-of-band communication channel.
A chain of k malicious neighbors is considered as one attacker
with an extended wireless reach. Distributed attackers scattered
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(b) Detection of Removed Nonces
Fig. 6. NONCE DUPLICATE AND REMOVAL DETECTION – Squares denote
array elements, circles denote single nonces. Attacker M1 copies the nonces
from the correct array element to the index of the spoofed rank of M3. In a)
Nodes check for duplicates and detect the modification. In b) M1 removes
the duplicate nonces. Honest node H detects missing nonces and drops the
message.
among different hierarchy levels communicating out-of-band
channel cannot be detected and are not considered in our
model. However, non-collaborating attackers distributed in the
topology are considered. Finally, we ignore the false positive
rates on queries to bloom filters as they can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing appropriate parameters.
Proof: We consider the security of TRAIL in existence of
i) multiple non-collaborating malicious nodes and ii) multiple
malicious nodes with limited collaboration:
i) Multiple non-collaborating malicious nodes: Since the
nodes are not allowed to collaborate, they can be considered
as multiple single attackers. For simplicity, we provide the
analysis for a single malicious node. A malicious node re-
ceiving a topology test message 〈η,A〉 from its child(ren) has
the option to (1) not include its child(ren) in the message array
or to not merge-and-forward the array A at all. It may as well
(2) rearrange the array, and in particular include the nonces of
its child(ren) at a wrong array position. It may (3) attempt to
exclude itself from the attestation hierarchy by not submitting
its nonce value to its parent. These four choices of malicious
nodes will lead to the following conditions:
C1. By not forwarding the test nonces of its children or the
attestation array, the malicious node causes its imme-
diate detection. When receiving the signed attestation
message of the root, the child(ren) of the malicious node
will test for its nonces without success and detect the
inconsistency.
C2. The best a malicious node can do to its children is
writing nonces at the foreseen position. Any misplace-
ment will move data of the children to a lower rank
position and thus cannot be aligned with a malicious
rank upgrade. Other rearrangements of the array will
change the data positions for nodes lower in the tree.
This implies that affected nodes are not within the
wireless transmission range of the malicious node –
they had chosen the better rank of the malicious node
otherwise. As the malicious node cannot coordinate rank
advertisements outside its wireless reach, nodes will
remain unaware of their nonce moving to other rank
positions. Nodes will thus search at the original rank
position in the attestation message and corresponding
tests will fail.
C3. If the malicious node withholds its own nonce, but
cooperates in traversing the merged filter array, its honest
parent will merge the data with data from its other
children and insert at the proper position. Not delivering
the nonce will simply lead to a Bloom filter that does
not contain the nonce of the malicious node. Hence, an
malicious node causes nothing but excluding itself from
the verification process.
ii) Multiple malicious nodes with limited collaboration: We
mean by a limited collaboration that multiple attackers know
in advance their position in the topology and the desired rank
which they want to claim during an attack. This can be realized
by configuring them accordingly during their deployment.
Limited indicates that once they are deployed, those malicious
nodes, which are not within each other’s communication range,
cannot communicate anymore. TRAIL mitigates such attacks
as follows: A malicious node close to the root merges array
elements on behalf collaborating malicious nodes lower in
the topology that claim a false rank. Consequently, nonces of
honest nodes that are affected by the rank spoofing, are moved
to the correct array element. However, due to the malicious
merging of array elements, these nonces exist multiple times.
Such a duplicate either denotes a fraud or a false positive.
Given a false positive rate of f , we detect the attack with
probability 1− f . Deleting nonces from filters will cause that
an honest node on the path will detect the attack by comparing
the forwarded array with the signed one.
In any of the cases, forgery will not comply to a rank
decrease and will be detected, whenever it affects third party
nodes. All parents of a malicious node will always exclusively
write to the lower rank-test positions, which is the obvious
protection from rank spoofing in this procedure.
3) Details of the Bloom Filter: We use Bloom filters [24],
a space-efficient random data structure, to reduce message
lengths in our attestation scheme. A Bloom filter is defined
as a bit-vector, v of m bit and represents a data set. By
using k independent hash functions, each element of a set
of A = {a1, . . . , an} is mapped to k bits in v. By these
means, the size of each input element is reduced to at most
k bits. Due to randomized overlapping of bits from different
elements, the size may be reduced even further, but this may
return a false positive result of a query. Essentially, there is a
linear relation between number of bits used for storing each
element, and the false positive rate. Mitzenmacher [26] could
show that properly designed Bloom filters can be compressed
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Fig. 7. TRAIL MESSAGE SIZES: Average message size distribution for
varying fanout degrees k as functions of the network size.
even further by about 30 % at a given false positive rate.
Almeida et. al. [25] designed a scalable extension of Bloom
filters that linearly add filter elements with increasing set sizes.
In TRAIL, we require tiny Bloom filters that store nonces
from the children set of a single node. For a commonly small
fanout of k nodes and a false positive rate below 1%, an
appropriate bit-size m of the (compressed) Bloom filters can
be estimated as m = 6 k [bits].
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our RPL security scheme,
we have implemented TRAIL authentication (attestation and
announcement messages) as an extension to the existing
RPL protocol implementation on the RIOT platform [4]—
an integration of TRAIL in RPL ICMP control messages
has little effect on performance and is left to future protocol
engineering work. We deployed TRAIL on the DES Mesh
Testbed of FU Berlin [27] and performed the comparative
experiments described below. The focus of our evaluation lies
on the overhead cost and the temporal performance of TRAIL
in comparison to unmodified RPL routing. The critical cost
metrics for wireless sensor nodes are over the air transmission,
e.g., the number of messages sent, as well as message sizes.
First we analyze the message characteristics of TRAIL as a
function of the network size. The critical resource consumption
of TRAIL is given by the sizes of the attestation messages. As
nodes need to accumulate nonce values of their parent nodes,
the attestation array grows with increasing network sizes.
While messages are tiny at the leaf nodes, the array gets larger
towards the root node. Fig. 7 visualizes the average message
sizes for different fanout degrees k of the inner nodes as
functions of the total network size. For simplicity, we assume
balanced k-ary trees, but results are not strongly dependent
on tree shapes. It is clearly visible that small message sizes
compliant to 6LowPAN MTUs constrain network dimensions
by about ≈ 250 nodes. The characteristic performance aspects
of TRAIL for different network sizes and tree configurations
are summarized in Table II, from which we can extract the
extra traffic imposed by TRAIL: Two messages per node at
the given size distribution.
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Fig. 8. Per node performance in joining the DODAG: Pure RPL and the TRAIL overhead as observed in the testbed.
TABLE II
MESSAGE OVERHEAD FOR DIFFERENT NETWORK SIZES: (k= number of
children, h=height of the tree)
Network Configuration Message Overhead [Bytes]
k h #
Nodes
# Msg. per
node
Average
Size
Max.
Size
2
3 15 2 3.5 10.5
4 31 2 7.5 22.5
5 63 2 15.5 46.5
4
3 85 2 12.6 63
4 341 2 51 255
5 1365 2 204.6 1023
Our second evaluation targets at the temporal performance
of route convergence. We deployed TRAIL on 25 MSBA2
nodes distributed in the sensor network testbed and compared
with an identical pure RPL installation. RPL/TRAIL arranged
a DODAG with the highest rank of eight as visualized in
Fig. 8(a). Choosing an attacker (node 60) to announce a root
rank led to a break up of the pure RPL network. Only seven
nodes remained in the initial, upright network, while 17 nodes
reconnected to the bogus tree. TRAIL discovers and isolates
the attacker immediately with its (bogus) rank announcement.
As a consequence, TRAIL rearranged a connected tree of all
honest neighbors, excluding the bogus node.
Routing convergence times for tree construction were mea-
sured node-wise during the experiments. Comparisons be-
tween the pure RPL and the overhead induced by TRAIL
are plotted in Fig. 8(b). Naturally, the wireless ad-hoc regime
produces large variations that are visible for both, RPL and
TRAIL. Nevertheless, the additional times needed to join a
DODAG while performing the security extensions of TRAIL
remain below 20 % in most cases. Occasional authentica-
tion messages exceed this limit due to message loss and
retransmissions. However, such performance fluctuations are
characteristic for all mesh routing operations including RPL.
VII. CONCLUSIONS & OUTLOOK
This work focuses on routing security of RPL, a recent
routing protocol for the emerging Internet of Things. Intrin-
sically, RPL is vulnerable to topology attacks. Its rank and
version number need particular protection, since by spoofing
version and rank an attacker can obtain dominant impact on the
network. The current state of the art leaves relevant security
issues unresolved.
Our first contribution in this paper was to analyze and im-
prove VeRA, a cryptographically centered protection scheme.
We identified new attack vectors and modified VeRA to
withstand them. While returning to the topological core of the
problem, our second contribution introduces TRAIL. TRAIL
defines a test procedure to inquire on the actual path properties
of the routing system. This generic approach is built on first-
hand principles and – different from VeRA – requires almost
no cryptography. Its main cryptographic workload is carried
out by the root node, which acts as a (stronger) gateway in
typical RPL deployments. TRAIL is designed to minimize net-
work message exchanges and node resource consumption. Our
evaluations revealed that the transmissions of bits required by
TRAIL remain feasible for typical challenged environments,
and that a testbed of typical shape can well operate TRAIL
with limited additional effort. Future directions of this work
are twofold. First, we will further optimize our algorithms to
reduce dependency on network sizes. Second, we intend to
apply the TRAIL approach proposed for RPL to other routing
protocols.
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